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JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(h) 
and rules 3 and 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
ISSUE PRESENTED 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DETERMINED THAT 
THE DEFENDANT APPELLEE'S EMPLOYMENT AS A 
SCHOOL TEACHER SUBSEQUENT TO THE ENTRY OF 
THE DECREE OF DIVORCE DID NOT CONSTITUTE A 
SUBSTANTIAL AND MATERIAL CHANGE IN 
CIRCUMSTANCE SUFFICEENT TO MODD7Y THE DECREE 
OF DIVORCE, AS AMENDED. 
Standard of Review; This issue is one which is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. 
Determination by the trial court that there has been or there has not been a substantial change of 
circumstances warranting the modification of award of alimony is generally presumed valid and thus 
the Court of Appeals reviews such a ruling for an abuse of discretion. Wilde v. Wilde. 969 P.2d 438 
(Utah App. 1998); Wells v. Wells. 871 P.2d 1036, 1038 (Utah App. 1994). 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
A. Nature of Case. 
This case is a domestic relations matter concerning alimony only. Dr. Gary V. 
Petersen filed a Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce on October 9, 1995 asking that the court 
terminate his alimony obligation. This appeal is from the court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law and Order of August 10, 1998, following a bench trial on June 18, 1998. 
B* Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Court Below. 
1. On October 9, 1995, Dr. Petersen filed his Petition to Modify Decree of 
Divorce requesting that his obligation to pay alimony in the amount of $2,000.00 per month be 
terminated because the defendant, Julie A. Petersen, had obtained employment subsequent to the 
entry of Decree of Divorce and was no longer in need of the alimony originally awarded. Record 
("R")15-18. 
2. On October 26, 1995, Julie A. Petersen filed her Answer of Defendant to 
Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce. R. 19-22. 
3. A bench trial was held on June 18, 1998 before the Honorable Pamela G. 
Heffernan. R. 176-310. At the close of trial and following oral argument by counsel, Judge 
Heffernan made her ruling from the bench denying appellant's Petition to Modify "finding there has 
not been a substantial change in circumstances." Trial Transcript ("T") 129. R.306. 
4. On August 10, 1998, the court entered its Order and Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. R. 106-115. 
5. On October 9, 1998, the plaintiff filed a timely Motion for Extension of Time 
to Appeal, Memorandum in Support of Motion for Extension of Time to Appeal, Affidavit of Randa 
Buompensiero, Affidavit of Sandy Felkins, Affidavit of Michael K. Mohrman, Notice of Appeal and 
Bond. R. 130-165. 
6. On October 20, 1998, the plaintiff filed his Notice to Submit for Decision 
plaintiffs Motion for Extension of Time to Appeal. R. 168-170. 
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7. On November 4, 1998, Judge Pamela G. Heffernan signed her decision 
granting plaintiff s request for extension of time to appeal. R. 167. 
8. On October 30, 1998, plaintiff filed an Ex parte Motion for Enlargement of 
Time to File Docketing Statement with the Utah Court of Appeals. Addenda ("A") 1. 
9. Plaintiff filed his Docketing Statement on November 13, 1998. A. 2. 
C. Statement of Facts. 
1. The parties were divorced pursuant to a Decree of Divorce entered on or about 
November 4, 1993. A. 3. 
2. That Decree of Divorce was subsequently modified pursuant to order of the 
Utah Court of Appeals. A document denominated "Amendment do Decree of Divorce" was 
submitted to the court. It was not signed by the judge or entered. A. 4. 
3. The Decree of Divorce, as amended, provides for the payment by the plaintiff 
to the defendant of the sum of $2,000.00 per month as and for permanent alimony to continue until 
the earlier of defendant's death or remarriage. A. 4. Although the Amendment to Decree of Divorce 
was never actually signed and entered by the court, it was signed and approved as to form by counsel 
for both parties. A. 4. R. 16. 
4. The plaintiff is current in his payment of all alimony to the defendant. R. 107. 
5. The Decree of Divorce provided that the plaintiff was to pay $300.00 per 
month per child for child support. All child support payments have been made and the children are 
emancipated. None of the children are living with Mrs. Petersen. R. 107. T. 36. R. 213. 
3 
6. At the date of the parties' divorce, the plaintiff was a practicing physician in 
Ogden, Utah, in the field of internal medicine with earnings of approximately $100,000.00 per year. 
Following the divorce, the plaintiff undertook additional training in the field of invasive cardiology. 
The plaintiff currently practices in that field in Texarkana, Texas. The plaintiffs earnings have 
increased substantially and the plaintiff is financially able to pay the $2,000.00 per month as and for 
alimony to the defendant as previously ordered by the court. R. 107-108. 
7. At the time of the parties' divorce, the defendant was trained and educated 
as a school teacher but had not practiced her profession for approximately twenty years. It was 
determined at that time that it would be necessary for the defendant to recertify as a teacher in order 
to secure a teaching position. The defendant was unemployed at the time of the divorce. The 
alimony awarded the defendant was based, in part, upon the fact that the defendant was unemployed. 
R. 108. See also, Petersen v. Petersen, 737 P.2d 237, 239, 242-43 (Utah App. 1987). 
8. At the time of the parties' divorce, the defendant was trained and educated 
as a school teacher but had not practiced her profession for approximately twenty years. It was 
determined at that time that it would be necessary for the defendant to recertify as a teacher if she 
were to secure a teaching position. In addition, she was unemployed at the time of the divorce. The 
trial court found that her ability to obtain a teaching contract was "speculative". R. 109. See also, 
Petersen v. Petersen at 242-243. 
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9. Immediately after the Decree of Divorce was entered the defendant recertified 
as a school teacher and has been employed by the Weber County School District since the Decree 
of Divorce was entered. She has a Masters Degree. T. 52-53. R. 229-30. 
10. For the school years of 1996-97 the defendant made almost $46,000. T. 81. 
R. 258. For the school year of 1997-98 the defendant anticipated that she would make 
approximately $46,000 or $47,000, exclusive of alimony. T. 82. R. 259. 
11. The defendant, Julie Petersen, submitted itemized monthly expenses totaling 
approximately $4,700.00 a month and the court made a factual finding that those were her expenses. 
R. 110. 
12. The defendant, Julie Petersen, testified that at the time of the Decree of 
Divorce her house payment was between $1,500 and $1,600 per month. T. 44. R. 221. She has 
since refinanced the house and her monthly house payment is $1,179 per month. T. 33. R. 210. 
13. At the time the Decree of Divorce was entered she did not tithe to her church. 
At the present time she does pay tithing to the LDS church. The amount stated on her itemized 
expenses at trial was $620 per month. In actual fact, she testified that she tithed $450 a month. She 
also testified that she tithed on her net income including her income as a school teacher and alimony. 
T. 43-44. R. 220-21. 
14. She pays $285 per month on an insurance policy, of which she is the owner, 
on the life of Dr. Gary Petersen. T. 38. R. 215. 
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15. Her itemized expenses show $200 per month for her daughter at Weber State 
University and a housing expense for her son at Utah State University for $400. She testified at trial 
that this $600 expense was not actually incurred. T. 37. R. 24. 
16. The defendant listed her monthly expense for food and household supplies 
as $525 per month. She testified that number was based upon children living with her. She also 
testified at trial that at the present there were no children living with her and that her monthly food 
and household supply expense was somewhere between $400 and $500 per month. T. 36. R. 213. 
17. In 1995 the defendant received an inheritance of $50,000. At that time she 
paid off all her debts. T. 27. R. 204. In addition, she put the remainder of those funds into CD's. 
T. 28. R. 205. She deposited approximately $23,000. T. 28. R. 205. 
18. At the time the parties were divorced in November of 1983, the home, which 
was awarded to the defendant, was valued at approximately $330,000. T. 48. R. 225. It has not 
been reappraised. 
19. Mrs. Petersen owes approximately $90,000 on her home. T. 86. R. 263. She 
lives alone in the home, which is 5,000 square feet. T. 86. R. 263. 
20. The defendant has state retirement income and contributes almost $7,500 per 
yeartoher401(k). T. 81. R. 258. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DETERMINED THAT 
THE DEFENDANT/APPELLEE'S EMPLOYMENT AS A 
SCHOOL TEACHER SUBSEQUENT TO THE ENTRY OF 
THE DECREE OF DIVORCE DID NOT CONSTITUTE A 
SUBSTANTIAL AND MATERIAL CHANGE IN 
CIRCUMSTANCE SUFFICIENT TO MODIFY THE DECREE 
OF DIVORCE, AS AMENDED 
The trial judge states in her conclusions of law: 
2. That the Plaintiff has failed to meet his threshold burden to show 
a substantial change in circumstances sufficient to modify the decree 
of divorce as amended. 
R. 110. This finding is an abuse of discretion and an error in law. The following facts are 
undisputed. First, at the time the Decree of Divorce was entered the defendant, Julie Petersen, was 
unemployed. The court assumed that re-employment as a school teacher would be speculative at 
best. Since the Decree of Divorce was entered she has been employed as a school teacher in Weber 
County for approximately sixteen years. She has had the opportunity to enjoy that income in 
addition to the $2,000 per month alimony that Dr. Petersen was ordered to pay. In addition, she 
received an inheritance in 1995 and paid off all of her debts save one, i.e. her home mortgage. 
She has refinanced the house to the point where her monthly obligation is now 
between $400 and $500 less than it was when the parties were married. She has deposited a 
remaining portion of her inheritance in savings, approximately $23,000. She contributes 
substantially to her 401(k), in the amount of approximately $7,500 per year. She has well over 
$50,000 in that account. She also participates in the Utah State Retirement System. She voluntarily 
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purchases life insurance on the appellant's life at a monthly cost of $285. She lives in a 5,000 square 
foot home, which has an equity in excess of a quarter of a million dollars. She has no monthly 
expenses except for those necessary to run her household and pay for her moderate mortgage 
obligation. She earns in excess of $46,000 a year. 
At the time the parties were divorced she was unemployed, had six children for which 
the plaintiff was paying $1,800 per month in child support and was receiving $2,000 per month in 
alimony. Alimony was based upon Dr. Petersen's ability to pay and Mrs. Petersen's need. 
It is obvious that the circumstances that existed that the time the parties were 
divorced have substantially and materially changed, and in a fashion not contemplated by the parties 
at the time the decree was entered. 
Two Utah cases are specifically relevant to this case. The case of Petersen v. 
Petersen, 737 P.2d 237 (Utah App. 1987), (which, in fact, is the appellate court decision in this 
matter requiring the payment of $2,000 per month in alimony) and Bridenbaugh v. Bridenbaugh. 786 
P.2d 241 (Utah App. 1990). 
In footnote 5 on page 243 of Petersen, supra, the court states in part: 
Of course, it would be proper for the district court to readjust the 
amount of alimony awarded to Mrs. Petersen if at any point in time 
there develops a material change in circumstances, such as Mrs. 
Petersen securing gainful employment.... 
Italics original, emphasis added. Petersen, supra at 243. 
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In Bridenbaugh. a case remarkably similar to the matter at hand, this court affirmed 
the trial court's termination of alimony where the wife obtained a master's degree in social work, 
became employed with the Granite School District as a social worker for fourteen years, earning 
approximately $16,200 a year and where the husband, who at the time the decree of divorce was 
entered, was earning approximately $30,000 a year, and, who at the time of the appeal, was then 
earning $240,000 per year. The court terminated the wife's alimony based upon the substantial 
change in circumstances, which consisted, in part, of her employment as a social worker in the 
Granite School District. 
The long and the short of it is, the plaintiff has met his burden of establishing a 
substantial and material change in circumstances. Furthermore, the substantial change of 
circumstance warrants that the plaintiffs alimony obligation be terminated. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DETERMINED THAT 
THE DEFENDANT/APPELLEE'S EMPLOYMENT AS A 
SCHOOL TEACHER SUBSEQUENT TO THE DECREE OF 
DIVORCE DID NOT CONSTITUTE A SUBSTANTIAL 
MATERIAL CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCE SUFFICIENT TO 
MODIFY THE DECREE OF DIVORCE, AS AMENDED, 
In 1987, when this court entered its decision on Dr. Petersen's initial appeal, it 
determined that Mrs. Petersen was entitled to $2,000 per month in permanent alimony in addition 
to the $1,800 per month she would receive as child support for the parties' six children then residing 
with her. This court observed that Dr. Petersen was capable of earning $100,000 per year while Mrs. 
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Petersen's ability to obtain recertification and secure a teaching contract was actually speculative. 
Petersen v. Petersen, 737 P.2d 237, 239 (Utah App. 1987). In addition, in commenting upon its 
award of $2,000 per month in alimony this court made the following observation in footnote 5 on 
page 243 of the decision: "Of course, it would be proper for the district court to readjust the amount 
of alimony awarded to Mrs. Petersen if at any point in time their develops a material change of 
circumstances, such as Mrs. Petersen securing gainful employment. . . ." Id. at 243. It is obvious 
that this court felt that subsequent employment by Mrs. Petersen would constitute a material change 
in circumstance such that an evaluation of the alimony award should be reconsidered. Mrs. Petersen 
was employed almost immediately after the Decree of Divorce was entered in November of 1983 
and has been employed on a continuing basis ever since. She now makes almost $50,000 per year. 
The following facts are relevant to an analysis as to whether or not Mrs. Petersen's 
employment subsequent to the entry of the Decree of Divorce constitutes a substantial and material 
change of circumstance warranting termination or reduction in the alimony award. First, at the time 
the Decree of Divorce was entered, she was unemployed. Second, she subsequently became 
certified and obtained her Masters Degree. At the time of the divorce, she had six children living 
with her. All six of the parties children are now emancipated and none are living with the defendant. 
Her current income of between $46,000 and $47,000 per year is almost half of the parties' income 
at the time they were divorced. 
The defendant has enjoyed a substantial increase in her net worth. She has substantial 
savings, equity in the parties' home, and retirement accounts. She has reached the point in time 
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where she has virtually no bills except those associated with her mortgage obligation and her 
personal expenses. 
Dr. Petersen, for his part, has also enjoyed a substantial increase in his ability to earn 
income and in his net worth. For purposes of the trial in this matter, he conceded that he has the 
ability to continue to pay alimony. 
Therefore, the question before this court is almost identical to the question that was 
before this court in the matter of Bridenbaugh v. Bridenbaugk 786 P.2d 241 (Utah App. 1990). The 
question is whether there was a sufficient material change in Mrs. Petersen's economic 
circumstances to justify the termination of Dr. Petersen's alimony. The facts in Bridenbaugh are 
remarkably similar to those in this case. In Bridenbaugh the parties were divorced in 1965 after a 
ten year marriage. They had two children for which Mr. Bridenbaugh was ordered to pay child 
support at the rate of $150 per child. Also, he was ordered to pay $400 per month as alimony to 
Mrs. Bridenbaugh. At the time the decree was entered Mrs. Bridenbaugh was unemployed. 
Subsequent to the decree of divorce she obtained her Masters Degree in social work and thereafter 
began work in the Granite School District as a social worker. She worked at that job for fourteen 
years. Mr. Bridenbaugh then filed a petition to modify the decree of divorce specifically for the 
purpose of terminating her alimony. In 1987, Mrs. Bridenbaugh was earning approximately $16,200 
from her employment, $4,600 from her alimony payments and an additional $5,800 from certain 
interest, dividends and mutual fund earnings. Mr. Bridenbaugh, on the other hand, who in 1965 had 
been earning approximately $30,000 a year for the benefit of a family of four was now earning 
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approximately $240,000 per year and had a net worth of about two and one-half million dollars. Id. 
at 242. This court affirmed the trial court's findings that the circumstances surrounding Mrs. 
Bridenbaugh's employment and improved financial condition constituted a substantial change in 
circumstances warranting termination of the alimony award. The court stated: 
The appropriate test to determine whether the termination in alimony 
was appropriate is whether [Mrs. Bridenbaugh] is now able to 
provide for herself a standard of living which is equal to that enjoyed 
during the marriage of the parties. We conclude that there is 
substantial evidence supporting the court's finding that plaintiff can 
now live at a level which is at least equal to that enjoyed during the 
marriage. Therefore, the court did not err in terminating alimony. 
Concomitantly, there was no error in denying an increase in alimony, 
as the purpose of alimony is to allow the recipient spouse a standard 
of living as close as possible to that experienced during the marriage, 
not to provide subsequent improvements to keep pace with those of 
the payor spouse. 
Id. at 243. For purposes of legal analysis, Bridenbaugh is virtually identical to the case at hand. 
Mrs. Petersen, at present, makes between 46 and 47 percent of the total family 
income earned by Dr. Petersen to support a family of eight at the time the parties were divorced. 
However, she can utilize that entire income of approximately $46,000 to $47,000 per year for her 
own support. By her own admission, she paid off all of her bills in 1995. She has savings of not less 
than $23,000 in various CD's. She has in excess of $50,000 in a 401(k) retirement account. She has 
no obligation for the support of any person other than herself. She owns a home with substantial 
equity. It is obvious that she is capable of providing for herself a standard of living that is equal to 
or better than the standard of living that she enjoyed at the time that the parties were divorced. 
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As general principal, because Dr. Petersen is seeking to modify the prior alimony 
award it is his burden to establish that there has been a substantial change of circumstances which 
justifies that modification. Wilde v. Wilde, 969 P.2d 438 (Utah App. 1998); Wells v. Wells. 871 
P.2d 1036 (Utah App. 1994); Paffel v. PaffeL 732 P.2d 96 (Utah App. 1986); and Maughan v. 
Maughan, 770 P.2d 156 (Utah App. 1989). 
In general, Dr. Petersen must also show Mrs. Petersen is able to support herself in 
a standard of living to which she was accustomed during the period that the parties were married. 
See Fullmer v. Fullmer. 761 P.2d 942, 951 (Utah App. 1988). In the 1982 case of Haslam v. 
Haslam. 657 P.2d 757 (Utah 1982), the Utah Supreme Court determined that the husband met his 
burden of showing that there was a substantial change in circumstances when it was determined that 
the wife had obtained employment after the divorce and where her income had increased 
substantially. Interestingly, in Haslam the court also made the observation that the husband had 
retired and his income had remained the same. However, in the case of Bridenbaugh v. 
Bridenbaugh. this court dismissed the fact that the husband had increased his ability to earn income 
eightfold (approximately the same increase as in this case). 
The trial court's finding that Mrs. Petersen's employment subsequent to the Decree 
of Divorce and subsequent improvement in her financial condition was not a material change in 
circumstances warranting termination or reduction in her alimony was either a misunderstanding or 
misapplication of the law resulting in substantial and prejudicial error to the appellate or it was a 
clear abuse of discretion. 
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Dr. Petersen has clearly met his burden of showing that the trial court failed to 
apprehend the facts in such a fashion as to properly apply Utah law. Specifically, the facts as 
articulated above do constitute a material change in circumstance as specifically set out by this court 
in the case of Bridenbaugh v. Bridenbaugh. 786 P.2d 241 (Utah App. 1990) and as anticipated by 
this court in the case of Petersen v. Petersen. 737 P.2d 237 (Utah App. 1987). 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant respectfully requests that this court reverse the trial court's determination 
that there was no material change of circumstances sufficient to warrant termination of alimony and 
remand to the trial court with instructions to enter an order consistent with its ruling. 
, 1999. Respectfully submitted this ^—day of CA^Y'( 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 
& NELSON 
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P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465 
Telephone: (801) 531-2000 
Fax No.: (801) 532-5506 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
GARY V. PETERSEN, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
JULIE A. PETERSEN, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
DOCKETING STATEMENT 
Appellate No. 981652-CA 
Appellant, Gary V. Petersen, through his undersigned counsel and pursuant to 
Rule 9 Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, submits the following Docketing Statement in 
connection with this appeal. 
1. DATE OF ORDER APPEALED FROM: The date of the Order sought to 
be reviewed is August 10, 1998, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit "A". The trial court's 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were entered the same date, an unsigned copy of which 
is attached as Exhibit "B". 
2. NATURE OF POST JUDGMENT MOTIONS AND DATES FILED: No 
motion has been filed pursuant to rules 50(a) and (b), 52(b), 54(b), or 59 Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
3. DATE OF FILING NOTICE OF APPEAL: Notice of Appeal was filed on 
October 9, 1998. A Motion for Extension of Time to Appeal, Memorandum in Support of 
Motion for Extension of Time to Appeal, affidavits, and Undertaking on Appeal were also filed 
on October 9, 1998. On November 4, 1998 the trial court granted plaintiff's request for 
extension of time to appeal. 
4. JURISDICTION: This court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(h). 
5. NAME OF TRIAL COURT: This appeal is from final orders entitled 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order which were signed on July 30, 1998, and 
entered on August 10, 1998 in the Second Judicial District Court in and for Weber County. 
6. STATEMENT OF FACTS: 
(a) The parties were divorced pursuant to a Decree of Divorce entered 
on or about November 4, 1993. That Decree of Divorce was subsequently modified 
pursuant to Order of the Utah Court of Appeals. 
(b) The Decree of Divorce, as amended, provides for the payment by 
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the plaintiff to the defendant of the sum of $2,000 00 per month as and for permanent 
alimony to continue until the earlier of defendant's death or remarriage. 
(c) The plaintiff is current in the payment of all alimony to the 
defendant. 
(d) That the Decree of Divorce also provided that the plaintiff pay 
$300.00 per month per child for child support. All child support payments have been 
made. 
(e) Each of the parties' six children is emancipated. 
(f) At the date of the parties' divorce, the plaintiff was a practicing 
physician in Ogden, Utah, in the field of internal medicine with earnings of 
approximately $100,000.00 per year. Following the divorce, the plaintiff undertook 
additional training in the field of invasive cardiology. The plaintiff currently practices in 
that field in Texarkana, Texas. The plaintiffs earnings have increased substantially and 
the plaintiff is financially able to pay the $2,000.00 per month as and for alimony to the 
defendant as previously ordered by the court. 
(g) At the time of the parties' divorce, the defendant was trained and 
educated as a school teacher but had not practiced her profession for approximately 
twenty years. It was determined at that time that it would be necessary for the defendant 
to re-certify as a teacher in order for her to secure a teaching position. The defendant was 
unemployed at the time of the divorce. The alimony awarded to the defendant was based, 
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in part, upon the fact that the defendant was unemployed. 
(h) Following the parties divorce, the defendant did in fact become re-
certified and has been employed by the Weber County School District since the Decree 
of Divorce was entered. The trial court found that the defendant, under her contract 
which is renegotiated and renewed on a year to year basis, has had earnings of 
$39,200.00 in 1996 and $40,400.00 in 1997. She is a participant in a State of Utah 
retirement plan and a 401(k) plan through her employer, to which she is a contributing 
participant. 
(i) In 1995, the defendant received approximately $51,000.00 as an 
annuity and approximately $17,000.00 in cash as a result of the death of her mother and 
she paid income tax on the annuity portion of the inheritance in the approximate amount 
of $18,000.00. In the original Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the trial court 
determined: 
"that while the defendant is a college graduate with a Bachelor's 
Degree and is trained as a school teacher, she is not currently 
certificated and will require additional training to become 
certificated. In addition, the court finds that if certificated, 
defendant's ability to produce income would approximate one-
fourth (1/4) to one-fifth (1/5) that of the plaintiff in the event she 
could secure a teaching contract which is speculative at best. 
Further, the court finds that the express intention of the defendant 
is to pursue an education in a field other than teaching." 
(j) Trial was held before the Honorable Pamela G. Heffeman on 
Thursday, June 18, 1998. 
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(k) In the Findings of Fact, entered on August 10, 1998, Judge 
Heffernan determined that: 
12. That the circumstances of the defendant have not substantially 
changed since the entry of the Decree of Divorce herein i.e., she 
resides in the same residence that was the parties' marital 
residence at the date of divorce; her basic expenses have not 
substantially or materially changed; she has accepted and 
continuously pursued her employment in order to meet her 
monthly expenses and provide for her support and maintenance 
and that she has not received and retained substantial funds by way 
of gift of inheritance which have altered or affected her 
circumstances significantly. 
(Emphasis added). 
(1) In the Conclusions of Law entered on August 10, 1998, Judge 
Heffernan concluded: 
2. That the plaintiff has failed to meet his threshold burden to 
show a substantial change in circumstances sufficient to modify 
the decree of divorce as amended. 
3. That plaintiffs Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce should be 
denied. 
7. ISSUE FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD FOR REVIEW: The issue 
presented by this appeal is whether or not the trial court erred when it determined that the 
circumstances of the defendant had not substantially changed since the entry of the decree of 
divorce. In particular, was it error for the trial court to determine that the circumstances of the 
defendant had not materially or substantially changed since the entry of the Decree of Divorce 
even though she subsequently obtained employment as a school teacher. This issue is solely a 
5 
question of law, with no deference to be given to the trial court's decision, and is reviewed for 
correctness. See State v Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774, 782 (Utah 1991); Barnes v Barnes. 857 P 2d 
257, 262 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); Allred v. Allred. 797 P.2d 1108, 1111 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
8. DETERMINATIVE LAW: Petersen v. Petersen. 737 P.2d 237 (Utah App. 
1987); Bridenbaueh v. Bridenbaueh. 786 P.2d 241 (Utah App. 1990). 
9. RELATED APPEAL: There has been one prior appeal in this case, 
Petersen v. Petersen. 737 P. 2d 237 (Utah App. 1987). 
10. ATTACHMENT: A. Order; B. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
DATED this / g ^ a y of /VW^t^A^<1998. 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 
& NELSON 
6 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copyy^f the foregoing instrun 
was mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, on this / ^ day of pjyt/A—v^^




Clark W. Sessions 
CLYDE, SNOW, SESSIONS & SWENSON 
One Utah Center 
201 South Main, 13 th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
13112-001 
226450 
Paul M. Belnap 
STRONG &HANNI 
Sixth Floor, Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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Clark W. Sessions, Esq. 
SESSIONS & MOORE 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
300 First Federal Plaza 
505 East 200 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 359-4100 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
GARY V. PETERSON, 
Plaintiff, 
JULIE A. PETERSON, 
Defendant. 
oooOooo— 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. 83079 
The above-entitled matter having come on regularly for 
trial before the Honorable Calvin Gould, one of the judges of the 
above-entitled court on the 7th day of October, 1983 and 
continuing thereafter on October 11, 1983. The Plaintiff Gary V. 
Peterson was present and represented by Pete N. Vlahos of Vlahos, 
Perkins & Sharp, Plaintiff's attorneys. The Defendant Julie A. 
Peterson was present in person and represented by Clark W. 
Sessions of Sessions & Moore, Defendant's attorneys. The parties 
were duly sworn and examined in support of the Complaint and 
Counterclaim on file herein. The Court heard and received the 
i 
stipulation of the parties concerning certain matters and oral 
and documentary evidence and after taking the matter under 
3> l T . ^  
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advisement, issued its Memorandum Decision on the 18th day of 
October, 1983 and being fully advised in the premises and having 
made and entered its FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
NOW, THEREFORE, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND 
DECREED as follows: 
1. That the Plaintiff and the Defendant be and they are 
hereby awarded a Decree of Divorce each from the other on the 
grounds of mental cruelty, dissolving the bonds of matrimony 
heretofore existing between the parties, said divorce to become 
final upon its entry herein and any and all applicable waiting 
periods in connection therewith, including the interlocutory 
period, be and the same are hereby waived. 
2. That the Defendant be and she is hereby awarded the 
care, custody and control of the six (6) minor children of the 
parties, to-wit: Erick Scott born January 9, 1966; Cami Lyn born 
April 17, 1970; Stephanie Ann born December 4, 1970; Tifani Jill 
born November 30, 1972; Ryan Mathew born October 1, 1975; and 
Andrea Kay born November 9, 1977 and the Plaintiff be and he is 
hereby awarded reasonable rights of visitation at all reasonable 
times and places provided that the Plaintiff is hereby ordered to 
give to the Defendant prior notice of the Plaintiff's exercise of 
visitation rights and that the Plaintiff shall accommodate the 
requests of the minor children for and in connection with the 
exercise of such visitation rights as their respective schedules, 
activities and best interests dictate. Further, the Plaintiff is 
awarded visitation rights of and with said minor children every 
-2- K 
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other weekend and alternating holiday and vacation periods 
hereafter. 
3. That the Plaintiff be and he is hereby ordered to pay 
to the Defendant the sum of Three Hundred Dollars ($300.00) per 
month per child as and for child support, a total of One Thousand 
Eight Hundred Dollars ($1,800.00) per month to continue until 
such children reach the age of eighteen (18) years or graduate 
from high school if later. 
4. That the Plaintiff be and he is hereby awarded the 
right to claim Erick Scott, Cami Lyn, Stephanie Ann Tifani Jill, 
Ryan Mathew and Andrea Kay as exemptions and deductions for 
Federal and State income tax purposes for the taxable year 1983 
and taxable years following the entry of the Decree of Divorce 
herein. 
5. That the Defendant is awarded and the Plaintiff be and 
he is hereby ordered to pay to the Plaintiff commencing on the 
first day of November, 1983 and continuing on the first day of 
each calendar month thereafter, the sum of One Thousand Dollars 
($1,000.00) per month permanent alimony to continue until the 
earlier of the Defendant's death or remarriage at which time 
alimony shall cease and no longer be payable. 
6. That the Defendant is awarded and the Plaintiff be and 
he is hereby ordered to pay to the Plaintiff as a lump-sum 
property settlement award, the sum of One Hundred Twenty Thousand 
Dollars ($120,000.00) payable in equal monthly installments of 
-3-
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One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00) each without interest from the 
date of entry hereof until paid, 
7. That the Defendant be and she is hereby awarded as her 
sole and separate property, without claim from the Plaintiff, the 
parties' residence, real property and adjacent lot known as and 
located at 6039 Breeze Circle, Ogden, Utah, subject to the 
existing first mortgage obligation thereon, which the Defendant 
is ordered to assume, pay and discharge and hold the Plaintiff 
harmless therefrom. 
8. That the Defendant be and she is hereby awarded as her 
sole and separate property, without claim from the Plaintiff, the 
furniture, furnishings, fixtures, appliances and personal 
property located in and at the residence, real property and lot 
hereinabove described, provided however, the Plaintiff be and he 
is hereby awarded as his sole and separate property, without 
claim from the Defendant, the parties' wooden secretary bookcase, 
video camera and lighting system, yellow overstuffed chair and 
ottoman and the parties' coffee table located in the parties' 
family room at said residence. 
9. That the Defendant be and she is hereby awarded as her 
sole and separate property, without claim from the Plaintiff, the 
parties' 1977 Surburban vehicle and the parties' Datsun 
automobile currently being used by the parties' children. 
10. That the Defendant be and she is hereby awarded as her 
sole and separate property, without claim from the Plaintiff, 




Defendant is the owner of such policies. Such award shall 
include but shall not be limited to, the right to receive cash 
values therefrom, designate beneficiaries thereunder and all 
rights, duties and responsibilities appurtenant thereto. 
11. That the Defendant be and she is hereby awarded one 
half (%) of the parties' interest in and to a partnership and 
investment known as J&E Associates, a partnership, without claim 
from the Plaintiff. 
12. That the Defendant be and she is hereby awarded any and 
all interest in and to any pension, profit sharing, retirement or 
similar plan or benefit, to which she may become entitled by 
reason of her future employment or otherwise, without claim from 
the Plaintiff. 
13. That the Plaintiff be and he is hereby awarded as his 
sole and separate property, without claim from the Defendant, all 
right, title and interest in and to Gary V. Peterson, M.D., a 
professional corporation. 
14. That the Plaintiff be and he is hereby awarded as his 
sole and separate property, without claim from the Defendant, all 
right, title and interest in and to all pension and profit 
sharing contributions, rights and benefits, now existing or 
hereafter acquired by or vested in the Plaintiff in the Gary V. 
Peterson, M.D., a professional corporation, pension, profit 
sharing and retirement plans and any future interest in any 
similar pension, profit sharing or retirement 'plan acquired 
through Plaintiff's employment or otherwise. 
-5-
15. That the Plaintiff be and he is hereby awarded as his 
sole and separate property, without claim from the Defendant, any 
and all interest in and to that certain X-ray machine and related 
equipment, supplies and accessories, currently the subject of a 
family trust known as the Gary V, Peterson Family Irrevocable 
Trust, including the right to revoke said trust in the event the 
same is revocable. The Plaintiff is further awarded as his sole 
and separate property, without claim from the Defendant, the 
parties' right, title and interest in and to the real property, 
improvements and furniture, fixtures, appliances and personal 
property located in and at the Yorkshire Condominium, Ogden, 
Utah, the parties' condominium at 4956 Quail Lane, Ogden, Utah 
and the rental residence and real property located at 580 28th 
Street, Ogden, Utah and the Plaintiff be and he is hereby ordered 
to assume, pay and discharge any and all obligations existing in 
connection with said property, improvements and personal 
properties and hold the Defendant harmless therefrom. 
16. That the Plaintiff be and he is hereby awarded as his 
sole and separate property, the parties' boat, motor and trailer, 
one half (%) of the parties' interest in J&E Investments, a Utah 
partnership, the parties1 Biomass Partnership interest, Peterson 
Land Development and the Knowlwood Condominium, Ogden, Utah, 
acquired by the Plaintiff following the separation of the 
parties' and all furniture, furnishings, fixtures and appliances 
located therein and thereat, without claim from the Defendant, 
provided however, the Plaintiff is ordered to assume, pay and 
-6-
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discharge any and all obligations connected therewith and hold 
the Defendant harmless therefrom. 
17. That the Plaintiff be and he is hereby awarded the 
undivided one seventh (1/7) interest in and to the parties1 Bear 
Lake property (the subject of the Plaintiff1 s parents' Trust) and 
the Defendant be and she is hereby ordered and directed to convey 
her undivided one seventh (1/7) interest therein to the parties' 
youngest minor child Andrea Kay, as Beneficiary, pursuant to the 
same terms, provisions and conditions as each of the other minor 
children own a one seventh (1/7) interest therein and thereto. 
18. That each of the parties are awarded their own personal 
effects, wearing apparel, jewelry and personal property currently 
in their possession without claim from the other. 
19. That the parties be and they are hereby ordered to file 
Federal and State income tax returns for the calendar year 1983 
on such bases as are in the best interests of the parties and 
each party is ordered to pay that portion of any such tax 
assessment and obligation attributable to the parties on the same 
ratio that each such parties income bears to the total income of 
the parties and in the event of any refund, rebate or allowance 
such shall be divided between the parties on a like basis. 
20. That the Plaintiff and he is hereby ordered to assume, 
pay, discharge and hold the Defendant harmless from, the 
following debts and obligations incurred during the course of the 
marriage of the parties: 
-7-
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A. The existing second mortgage on the parties' 
residence and real property located at 6039 Breeze Circle, 
Ogden, Utah, in the approximate sum of Forty-Four Thousand 
Dollars ($44,000.00); 
B. The existing loan secured by a third mortgage on 
the parties' residence and real property located at 6039 
Breeze Circle, Ogden, Utah, in favor of Gary V. Peterson, 
M.D., pension and profit sharing plan in the approximate sum 
of Twelve Thousand Dollars ($12,000,00) and other loans, if 
any, made to the Plaintiff by said pension and profit 
sharing plan; 
C. An existing open account obligation to Texaco in 
the approximate sum of Three Hundred Fifty Dollars 
($350.00); 
D. The September and October, 1983 first mortgage 
payments on the parties' residence and real property at 6039 
Breeze Circle, Ogden, Utah, together with outstanding 
utility bills, obligations and accounts in connection 
therewith; 
E. Outstanding open account charges incurred by the 
parties for children's clothing and accessories necessary 
for the children's enrollment in public schools for the 1983 
school year; and 
F* All personal expenses and obligations incurred for 




21. That the Defendant be and she is hereby ordered to 
assume, pay, discharge and hold the Plaintiff harmless from, the 
following bills and obligations incurred during the course of the 
parties' marriage: 
A. All open accounts, charge accounts and similar 
obligations not hereinabove specifically ordered to be paid 
by the Plaintiff; 
B. All debts, obligations and charges incurred for 
the use and benefit of the Defendant since the separation of 
the parties, including loans from the Defendant's parents 
and other relatives. 
22. That the Plaintiff be and he is hereby ordered to 
provide at his sole cost and expense, health, accident, medical 
and dental insurance on and for the benefit of the parties1 six 
(6) minor children, during his obligation of support thereof, 
provided however, the Plaintiff shall be allowed the right to 
schedule dental and medical services for the parties' minor 
children other than emergency services and the Defendant is 
ordered to cooperate with the Plaintiff in every respect in 
obtaining, securing and scheduling such services. Each of the 
parties are ordered to assume, pay and discharge any and all 
obligations for such medical and dental services not covered by 
such insurance on an equal basis. 
23. That each of the parties be and they are hereby ordered 
to assume, pay and discharge their own costs and expenses 
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incurred in connection with the above-entitled action, including 
attorney's fees. 
24. That each of the parties are hereby ordered to execute 
such deeds, conveyances, bills of sale and other documents as may 
be necessary to transfer the property as awarded by the Court to 
the party entitled thereto. 
DATED this ^ yLday ot^Wf^^ 
BY THE COURT: 
CaWin Gould 
D i s t r i c t Judge 
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Clark W. Sessions (2914) 
SESSIONS & MOORE 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
400 First Federal Plaza 
505 East 200 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 359-4100 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
GARY V. PETERSON, 
Plaintiff, i 
vs. 
JULIE A. PETERSON, i 
Defendant. : 
: AMENDMENT TO 
: DECREE OF DIVORCE 
: Civil No. 83079 
The above-entitled matter was presented to the undersigned, 
one of the Judges of the above-entitled Court pursuant to the 
remand of the Utah Court of Appeals in Peterson v. Peterson, Case 
No. 860007-CA filed May 18, 1987. The Plaintiff was represented 
by his attorney of record, Paul M. Belnap of Strong & Hanni, and 
the Defendant was represented by Clark W. Sessions of Sessions & 
Moore, her attorneys. The Court reviewed the opinion of the Utah 
Court of Appeals and being otherwise fully advised in the 
premises hereby orders as follows: 
1. That paragraph 5. of the Decree of Divorce entered 
herein be and the same is hereby deleted and the following 
substituted therefor. 
That the Defendant is awarded and the Plaintiff be and 
he is hereby ordered to pay to the Plaintiff commencing 
on the first day of November, 1983, and continuing on 
the first day of each calendar month thereafter, the 
sum of Two Thousand Dollars ($2,000.00) permanent 
alimony to continue to the earlier of the Defendant's 
death or remarriage at which time alimony shall cease 
and no longer be payable. 
2. That paragraph 6. of the Decree of Divorce entered 
herein be and the same is hereby deleted in its entirety, 
3. That all other terms, provisions, conditions and 
limitations contained in the Decree of Divorce entered herein 
shall remain in full force and effect to the extent the same are 
not in conflict herewith. 
DATED this day of , 1987. 
BY THE COURT: 
APPR 
CLARK W. SESSIONS 
Attorney for Defendant 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
\Jinla UrtbO n&HA <$i^zd~ 





CLARK W. SESSIONS (2914) 
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS 
One Utah Center, Thirteenth Floor 
201 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2215 
Telephone: (801) 537-5555 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OP UTAH 
GARY V. PETERSEN, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JULIE A. PETERSEN, 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
Civil No. 824983079 
Judge Pamela G. Heffernan 
The Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce filed by the 
Plaintiff herein came on regularly for trial before the 
undersigned, one of the judges of the above-entitled Court on 
Thursday, June 18, 1998. The Plaintiff was present in person and 
represented by Michael K. Mohrman of Richards, Brandt, Miller & 
Nelson, his attorneys. The Defendant was present in person and 
represented by Clark W. Sessions of Campbell Maack & Sessions, her 
attorneys. The Court heard and considered the evidence adduced, 
the arguments and statements of counsel, and having heretofore made 
and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, hereby 
ORDERS as follows: 
1. That the Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce be and the 
same is hereby denied, and 
2. That counsel for the Defendant be and he is hereby 
granted leave to file an application for attorneys' fees and costs 
incurred herein by way of affidavit for further consideration by 
the Court and the Plaintiff, by and through his counsel, be and he 
is hereby granted leave to file such opposition thereto as he shall 
deem necessary, following which the matter may be submitted to the 
Court for determination. 
DATED this day of 
District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I herewith certify that I am a member of and/or employed by 
the law firm of CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS, One Utah Center, 
Thirteenth Floor, 201 South Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utah and 
that in said capacity and pursuant to Rule 5(b) Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, the foregoing ORDER was served upon the plaintiff by 
placing a true and correct copy thereof in the U. S. mail, postage 
prepaid, to the following this ryH day of June, 1998: 
Michael K. Mohnaan, Esq. 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor 
50 South Main Street 
P. 0. Box 2465 




'ICLARK W. SESSIONS (2914) 
!i CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS 
One Utah Center, Thirteenth Floor 
201 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2215 
Telephone: (801) 537-5555 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THB SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
GARY V. PETERSEN, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JULIE A. PETERSEN, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 824983079 
Judge Pamela G. Heffernan 
The Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce filed by the 
[Plaintiff herein came on regularly for trial before the 
undersigned, one of the judges of the above-entitled Court on 
Thursday, June 18, 1998. The Plaintiff was present in person and 
Represented by Michael K. Mohrman of Richards, Brandt, Miller & 
Nelson, his attorneys. The Defendant was present in person and 
Represented by Clark W. Sessions of Campbell Maack & Sessions, her 
attorneys. The Court having heard and considered the evidence 
adduced, the arguments and statements of counsel, now makes and 
enters the following: 
I 
FINDINGS OF FACT , 
1. That the parties were divorce pursuant to a Decree of i 
Divorce entered on or about the 4ch day of November, 1993, which was 
subsequently modified as mandated by the Utah Court of Appeals. 
I 2. That the Decree of Divorce as amended, provides for the 
payment by the Plaintiff to the Defendant of the sum of $2,000 per 
month as and for permanent alimony to continue to the earlier of 
Defendant's death or remarriage. 
3. That the Plaintiff is current in the payment of all 
alimony to the Defendant as ordered by the Court. 
4. That the Decree of Divorce provided in addition for the 
payment of $300.00 per month per child as and for child support. I 
Further, all required child support payments have been made. 
5. That each of the parties' six children is emancipated. 
6. That at the date of the parties' divorce, the Plaintiff 
was a practicing physician in Ogden, Utah, in the field of internal i 
I 
medicine with earnings of approximately $100,000 per year. ' 
Following the divorce, the Plaintiff undertook additional training , 
in the field of invasive cardiology which he currently practices in 
I • 
J the State of Texas. Additionally, the Plaintiff's earnings have 
I increased to $300,000 gross income in 1995; $499,000 gross income 
|in 1996; and $735,000 gross income in 1997. The Court specifically 




month as and for alimony to the Defendant as heretofore ordered by 
the Court. 
7. That at the time of the parties' divorce, the Defendant 
was trained and educated as a school teacher but had not practiced 
her profession for approximately 20 years and that it would be 
necessary for her to re-certify as a teacher in order for her to 
secure a teaching position. 
j 8. That immediately following the parties' divorcef the 
Defendant did in fact become recertified and has been employed by 
ithe Weber County School District since the Decree of Divorce was 
entered. Further, the Court finds that the Defendant under her 
contract which is renegotiated and renewed on a year-to-year basis, 
she had earnings of $39,200 in 1996; earnings of $40,400 in 1997; 
and anticipates earnings of $41,800 in 1998. Additionally, she is 
a participant in a retirement plan on a state level and a 401(k) 
plan through her employer to which she is a contributing 
participant• 
9. That in 1995, the Defendant received approximately 
|$51,000 as an annuity and approximately $17,000 in cash as a result 
of the death of her mother Julia G. Theurer and that the Defendant 
paid income tax on the annuity portion of the inheritance in the 
approximate amount of $18,000 and further that the balance of said 
amounts other than approximately $20,000 which remains, was spent 
by the Defendant on various debts and obligations, incl-ding but 
ii 3 
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not limited to, counseling fees for the parties' children, 
improvements to the marital residence and the acquisition, jointly 
with adjacent neighbors, of property to the rear of the marital 
residence and damage to the marital residence caused by 
unanticipated power outages. 
10. That the original Findings of Fact entered by the trial 
court noted in Finding of Fact 29 in pertinent part ••. . . the 
Defendant has not been employed outside of the parties home, but is 
in all probability now required to seek employment and additional 
education and training in order to assist in providirg partial 
support for herself and the parties' minor children.11 
11. That the Defendant's itemized monthly expenses total 
approximately $4,700 per month which includes a contribution to a 
retirement plan which the Court finds is entirely appropriate to 
provide retirement income to the Defendant and that even if such 
amount were reduced, and certain other items and costs adjusted, 
the Defendant is in need of financial support and assistance from 
the Plaintiff in order to meet her ongoing monthly expenses. Such 
p.s particularly true given the fact that Court ordered child 
support in the sua of $1,800 per month has terminated as 
Hereinabove set forth. 
12. That the circumstances of the Defendant have not 
katerially or substantially changed since the entry of the Decree 
of Divorce herein i.e., she resides in the same residence that was 
the parties' marital residence at the date of divorce; her basic 
expenses have not substantially or materially changed; she has 
accepted and continuously pursued her employment in order to meet 
her monthly expenses and provide for her support and maintenance 
and that she has not received and retained substantial funds by way 
of gift or inheritance which have altered or affected her 
circumstances significantly. 
13. The Court finds that Defendant has retained the services 
of counsel to assist her in the defense of the Petition to Modify 
the Decree of Divorce and has incurred costs and attorney fees in 
connection therewith. 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now 
concludes as follows: 
CQHCLPfllQHfl OF LAW 
1. That the Court has In persona* and subject matter 
jurisdiction. J 
2. That the Plaintiff has failed to meet his threshold 
burden to show a substantial change in circumstances sufficient to 
modify the Decree of Divorce as amended. 
3. That Plaintiff's Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce 
should be denied. 
4. That counsel for the Defendant should be granted leave to 
rile an application for attorneys' fees and costs incurred herein 
by way of affidavit for further consideration by the Court and that 
i 5 
the Plaintiff, by and through his counsel, should be granted leave 
to file such opposition thereto ad he shall deem necessary. 
5. That the Court should make and enter its order 
accordingly. 
DATED this day of , 1998. 
BY THE COURT: 
PAMELA G. HEFFERNAN 
District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I herewith certify that I am a member of and/or employed by 
the law firm of CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS, One Utah Center, 
Thirteenth Floor, 201 South Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utah and 
that in said capacity and pursuant to Rule 5(b) Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, the foregoing FINDINGS 07 FACT AND CONCLUSIONS 07 LAW 
was served upon the plaintiff by placing a true and correct copy 
thereof in the U. S. mail, postage prepaid, to the following this 
Q ) I day of June, 1998: 
Michael K. Mohrman, Esq. 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor 
50 South Main Street 
P. 0. Box 2465 
j Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2000 
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